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LABOR-ANTITRUST-UNIoN HELD TO FORFEIT EXEMPTION
FROM SHERMAN ANTI-TRUST ACT BY AGREEING WITH EMPLOY-
ERS IN A COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AGREEMENT TO IMPOSE
UNIFORM LABOR STANDARDS ON OTHER UNREPRESENTED EM-
PLOYERS. UZJW v. Pennington; UNION-MANAGEMENT AGREE-
MENT FIXING HOURS OF BUSINESS HELD NOT A VIOLATION
OF SHERMAN ANTI-TRUST ACT. Local 189, Amalgamated Meat
Cutters v. jewel Tea Co. (U.S. 1965).
The trustees of the United Mine Workers of America Welfare
and Retirement Fund brought suit against the Phillips Brothers Coal
Company, seeking recovery of royalty payments allegedly due the
Fund under the provisions of the National Bituminous Coal Wage
Agreement of 1950. The defendant, a partnership, cross-claimed
against the union, alleging that it had conspired with certain large
coal operators in violation of the Sherman Anti-Trust Act.1 The
basis of the conspiracy charge was threefold, the main contention
being that pursuant to the agreement the union had abandoned its
opposition to mechanization of the coal industry and had agreed to
impose the terms of the agreement upon all coal operators.2 In re-
turn, the large coal operators had allegedly agreed to increase wages
as productivity increased through mechanization. Phillips alleged
that the ultimate effect of this agreement would be to eliminate the
marginal competitor from the industry due to the inability of the
smaller, non-mechanized operators to meet the union wage demands.
The district court denied the union's motion to dismiss the cross-
1 26 Stat. 209 (1890), 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (1964). Sections 1 and 2 are as follows:
§ 1. Every contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or con-
spiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce among the several States, or with
foreign nations, is declared to be illegal....
§ 2. Every person who shall monopolize, or attempt to monopolize, or com-
bine or conspire with any other person or persons, to monopolize any part of
the trade or commerce among the several States, or with foreign nations, shall
be deemed guilty of a misdemeanor, and, on conviction thereof, shall be
punished by fine not exceeding fifty thousand dollars, or by imprisonment not
exceeding one year, or by both said punishments, in the discretion of the court.
2 The two remaining bases for the conspiracy charge were: (1) it was contended
that the large coal companies had agreed not to lease coal lands to non-union coal
operators and had agreed to jointly approach the Secretary of Labor to obtain a mini-
mum wage for employees of operators selling coal to the TVA; (2) it was alleged that
the large coal companies, two of which had extensive union-held interests, had agreed
to cut prices on sale of coal to the TVA, thereby forcing the smaller coal companies
to sell at similar rates, which was alleged to be destructive to their operations.
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claim and the jury returned a verdict for Phillips against the union.
The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed$ and the Supreme Court
granted certiorari in order to decide the question: is a union, under
the circumstances of this case, exempt from antitrust liability? The
Supreme Court held that, if proved, the alleged conspiracy between
the union and a multi-employer bargaining unit to impose a uniform
wage agreement on non-bargaining members of the industry was not
exempt from antitrust liability.4 UMIW v. Pennington, 381 U.S. 657
(1965).
A similar question dealing with labor's exemption from antitrust
liability was raised in Local 189, Amalgamated Meat Cutters v. Jewel
Tea Co.,5 a companion case to Pennington. In Jewel Tea, repre-
sentatives of affiliated butchers' unions met with Associated, an
organization representing meat and grocery retailers, including Jewel
Tea Company, in order to negotiate an employment contract for
union members. Associated requested that the union consent to a
relaxation of an existing restriction on market hours, which forbade
the sale of fresh meat before 9 a.m. and after 6 p.m. in both service
and self-service markets.6 The union affiliates refused to accede to
the request and Associated, with the exception of Jewel Tea and
National Tea Company, signed a contract containing the same re-
striction. Owing to strike threats by the union, Jewel Tea later signed
the contract.
Shortly thereafter, Jewel Tea brought a suit under the Sherman
Act to invalidate the marketing hours restriction, alleging that the
unions and Associated had conspired to prevent Jewel from utilizing
night self-service sales as a means of competition. The union con-
tended that night marketing hours, even for self-service markets like
Jewel Tea's, were a legitimate union interest because they involved
conditions of employment of its members.
3 325 F.2d 804 (1964).
4 The Court reversed and remanded the decision due to the district court's failure to
properly instruct on the issue of admissibility of evidence. In Eastern R.R. Presidents
onf. v. Noeer Motor Freight Inc., 365 US. 127 (1961), evidence of competitors seek-
ing to obtain favorable legislation through means designed to influence a public official
was not sufficient to allow a finding of conspiracy. UMW v. Pennington, 381 U.S. 657,
669 (1965).
381 U.S. 676 (1965).
6 The restriction in controversy stated:
Market operating hours shall be 9:00 a.m. to 6:00 p.m. Monday through
Saturday, inclusive. No customer shall be served who comes into the market




After trial, the district court held that: (1) there was no evidence
to support a finding of conspiracy; (2) the unions had imposed the
marketing hours restriction to serve their own interest respecting
conditions of employment which was within the labor exemption of
the Sherman Act; (3) or, alternatively, that the restraint of trade,
if any, was reasonable.7 The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals re-
versed, holding that the restriction respecting marketing hours was
not a condition of employment, and therefore the contractual pro-
vision agreed to by the unions and Associated was itself sufficient
to demonstrate a conspiracy in restraint of trade.8 The Supreme Court
granted certiorari to answer the question: was the marketing hours
restriction, obtained through arms-length bargaining and not at the
request or in combination with non-labor groups, a legitimate union
interest and therefore exempt from the Sherman Act? The Supreme
Court held that a union-employer agreement on when, as well as
how long, employees must work is an immediate and direct concern
of the union and such an agreement is exempt from the Sherman
Act and may be imposed unilaterally by the union upon other em-
ployers in the industry. Local 189, Amalgamated Met Cutters v.
jewel Tea Co., 381 U.S. 676 (1965).
The federal courts initially interpreted the Sherman Act to include
union activities within the scope of its provisions." The first Supreme
Court decision applying the Act to union activities was Loewe v.
Lawlor.10 In the Loewe case, decided in 1908, a union's attempt to
organize the plaintiff's plant by means of a nationwide boycotting
of his goods and prevention of their sale in other states was held to
be a "combination in restraint of trade" within the meaning of the
Sherman Act.
Congress reacted to this judicial interpretation by enacting the
Clayton Act, which was intended to relieve union activities from
antitrust sanctions."1 However, the Supreme Court in 1921 narrowly
7 215 F. Supp. 839 (1963).
8 331 F.2d 547 (1964).
0 Early decisions applying the Sherman Act to unions are United States v. Work-
ingmen's Amalgamated Council, 54 Fed. 994 (C.C.E.D. La. 1893), aff'd, 57 Fed. 85
(5th Cir. 1893), and United States v. Debs, 64 Fed. 724 (C.C.N.D. Ill. 1894), aft'd,
158 U.S. 564 (1895).
10 208 U.S. 274 (1908).
11 Section 6, 38 Stat. 731 (1914), 15 U.S.C. § 17 (1964) ; and section 20, 38 Stat.
738 (1914), 29 U.S.C. § 52 (1964), are the relevant sections:
§ 6. The labor of a human being is not a commodity or article of commerce
. nor shall [labor] organizations, or the members thereof, be held or con-
strued to be illegal combinations or conspiracies in restraint of trade, under
the antitrust laws.
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construed the provisions of the Clayton Act in Duplex Printing Press
Co. v. Deering.12 In that case, which involved a factual situation
similar to that in Loewe, members of New York City machinists'
unions combined to boycott the sale of a Michigan manufacturer's
non-union made presses. The Court construed section 6 of the Clay-
ton Act to exempt labor unions only when they pursued the normal
and legitimate objects enumerated in section 20 and did not allow
them to conspire to unlawfully restrain trade by means of a sec-
ondary boycott. Furthermore, section 20 was construed to exempt
only those union activities directed against the union employees' own
employers, so the Court was therefore authorized to issue an injunc-
tion.
Reactions to Duplex and subsequent cases"8 restricting the Clayton
Act were the Norris-LaGuardia Act14 of 1932, which restored the
§ 20. No restraining order or injunction shall be granted by any court of the
United States, or a judge or the judges thereof, in any case between an em-
ployer and employees, or between employers and employees, or between em-
ployees, or between persons employed and persons seeking employment, in-
volving, or growing out of, a dispute concerning terms or conditions of
employment . . . . And no such restraining order or injunction shall prohibit
any person or persons, whether singly or in concert, from terminating any
relation of employment, or from ceasing to perform any work or labor, or
from recommending, advising, or persuading others by peaceful means so to
do; . . . nor shall any of the acts specified in this paragraph be considered
or held to be violations of any law of the United States.
12 254 U.S. 443 (1921).
13 See Bedford Cut Stone v. Journeymen Stonecutters Ass'n, 274 U.S. 37 (1927);
Coronado Coal Co. v. UMW, 268 U.S. 295 (1925); UMW v. Coronado Coal Co., 259
U.S. 344 (1922); Alco-Zander Co. v. Amalgamated Clothing Workers of America, 35
F.2d 203 (E.D. Pa. 1929); United States v. Railroad Employees' Dept. of A.F.L., 283
Fed. 479 (N.D. IIl. 1922).
14 47 Stat. 70 (1932), 29 U.S.C. §§ 101-15 (1964). Sections 4 and 13 are pertinent:
§ 4. Enumeration of specific acts not subject to restraining orders or injunc-
tions.
No court of the United States shall have jurisdiction to issue any restraining
order or temporary or permanent injunction in any case involving or growing
out of any labor dispute to prohibit any person or persons participating or
interested in such dispute (as these terms are herein defined) from doing,
whether singly or in concert, any of the following acts: (a) Ceasing or refusing
to perform any work or to remain in any relation of employment; (b) Becom-
ing or remaining a member of any labor organization or of any employer
organization, regardless of any such undertaking or promise as is described in
§ 103 of this title; (c) Paying or giving to, or withholding from, any person
participating or interested in such labor dispute, any strike or unemployment
benefits or insurance, or other moneys or things of value; (d) By all lawful
means aiding any person participating or interested in any labor dispute who is
being proceeded against in, or is prosecuting, any action or suit in any court of
the United States or of any State; (e) Giving publicity to the existence of,
or the facts involved in, any labor dispute, whether by advertising, speaking,
patrolling, or by any other method not involving fraud or violence; (f) As-
sembling peaceably to act or to organize to act in promotion of their interest
in a labor dispute; (g) Advising or notifying any person of an intention to
do any of the acts heretofore specified; (h) Agreeing with other persons to do
or not to do any of the acts heretofore specified; and (i) Advising, urging, or
otherwise causing or inducing without fraud or violence the acts heretofore
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broad exemptions provided by the Clayton Act, and the Wagner
Act' 5 of 1935, which narrowed the scope of the judiciary's power
to enjoin union activities by placing primary jurisdiction over labor
disputes in the National Labor Relations Board. 6
In Apex Hosiery Co. v. Leader,17 the Supreme Court held that a
sit-down strike, accompanied by violence which damaged the plain-
tiff's plant and prevented him from shipping his goods in interstate
commerce, was not a violation of the Sherman Act. The Court noted
that the Sherman Act was aimed at "restraint[s] upon commercial
competition in the marketing of goods or services,' '18 but distin-
guished between restrictions placed by a labor union on the labor
market as opposed to price or market competition and stated:
Since, in order to render a labor combination effective it must
eliminate the competition from non-union made goods, . . . an
elimination of price competition based on differences in labor stan-
dards is the objective of any national labor organization. But this
effect on competition has not been considered to be the kind of
curtailment of price competition prohibited by the Sherman
Act .... 9
Under the Apex facts, it was plain that the union "did not have as
its purpose restraint upon competition in the market for petitioner's
product. Its object was to compel petitioner to accede to the union
demands [for organization] .... ,20
specified, regardless of any such undertaking or promise as is described in
section 103 of this title.
§ 13 (c) The term "labor dispute" includes any controversy concerning terms
and conditions of employment, or concerning the association or representation
of persons in negotiating, fixing, maintaining, changing, or seeking to arrange
terms or conditions of employment, regardless of whether or not the disputants
stand in the proximate relation of employer and employee.
See GREGORY, LABOR AND THE LAw, 187 (2d rev. ed. 1958).
'5 49 Stat. 449 (1935), as amended by 61 Stat. 136 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 151-68
(1964).
16 49 Stat. 451 (1935), as amended by 61 Stat. 139 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 153 (1964).
Although the question of primary jurisdiction was raised in Jewel Tea, the Court
held that the facts of the case were not proper for application of the doctrine. The Court
reasoned that it was not without experience in classifying bargaining subjects and was
better equipped than the Board to determine the legal issues involved in Jewel Tea. The
Court pointed out that the function of the Board is to resolve disputes arising out of
refusals to bargain, a situation quite contrary to that in Jewel Tea, where the parties
did bargain and did in fact agree. The Court then concluded that a prior determina-
tion by the Board, necessarily entailing expense and delay, would be of subsidiary
importance at best, for the Court would still be called upon to decide the controlling
issues of the case. 381 U.S. at 686-87.
17 310 U.S. 469 (1940).
18 Id. at 495.
19 Id. at 503-04.
20 Id. at 501.
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The following year, United States v. Hutcheson21 became the first
Supreme Court case to construe the provisions of the Norris-
LaGuardia Act. The case arose from a jurisdictional dispute between
a carpenters' union and a machinists' union over the right of the
machinists to perform certain construction work for a large brewer.
The carpenters' union engaged in picketing and a consumer boycott
against the brewer and refused to allow its members to engage in
work for construction firms who were under contract to the brewer.
Mr. Justice Frankfurter promulgated the "interlacing statutes"' 22
doctrine in a landmark decision declaring that the question of
whether or not a union violated the Sherman Act could be answered
only when section 20 of the Clayton Act and section 4 of the Norris-
LaGuardia Act were read together as a "harmonizing text."23 Thus,
since the facts stated in the indictment brought against the union by
the United States came within the conduct enumerated in section 20
of the Clayton Act, they could not constitute a crime within the
meaning of the Sherman Act "because of the explicit command of
that Section that such conduct shall not be 'considered or held to be
violations of any law of the United States.' "24 The Court went on
to state:
So long as a union acts in its self-interest and does not combine
with non-labor groups, ... the licit and the illicit under section 20
are not to be distinguished by any judgment regarding the wisdom
or unwisdom, the rightness or wrongness, the selfishness or un-
selfishness of the end of which the particular union activities are
the means.
2 5
As a result of this statement by the Court, Hutcheson is generally
regarded as holding that any restraint of trade imposed by a labor
union acting alone and in its own economic self-interest is exempt
from the provisions of the Sherman Act.26
A significant refinement of the Hutcheson doctrine was formu-
21 312 U.S. 219 (1941).
22 Prank, The Myth of the Conflict Between Antitrust Law and Labor Law in the
Application of Antitrust Law to Union Activity, 69 DicK. L. REv. 1, 12 (1964).
23 312 U.S. at 231.
24 Id. at 232.
25 Ibid. The Hutcheson Court cited United States v. Brims, 272 U.S. 549 (1926).
In Brims, manufacturers of mill work combined with the union carpenters and mill
work contractors to reduce competition of out-of-state manufacturers. The union's in-
terest in wage increase was achieved, but the direct effect was a restraint of interstate
trade.
26 KIRSH, AUTOMATION AND COLLECTIVE BARGAINING 58 (1964); ATT*Y GEN.
NAT'L Comm. ANTrrRusT REP. 293 (1955); Steffen, Labor Activities in Restraint of
Trade. The Hutcheson Case, 36 ILL. L. Rv. 1 (1941).
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lated in Allen Bradley Co. v. Local 3, IBEW.2 7 The Court held that
where a union combined with a non-labor group via a collective
bargaining agreement among unions, employer-contractors, and elec-
trical equipment manufacturers to exclude the use or purchase of all
electrical goods produced outside the New York City area, the bar-
gaining agreement had gone beyond the limits of legitimate collec-
tive bargaining. The Court focused on the attempt by the employer
and manufacturer groups to shield themselves from prosecution
under the Sherman Act by enlisting the aid of the unions. The hold-
ing stated that the purpose of the labor exemption could not be con-
strued to bestow "upon such unions complete and unreviewable
authority to aid business groups to frustrate [the Sherman Act's]
primary objective,"28s that of preserving competition and preventing
restraints on trade. The Court in Allen Bradley followed the reason-
ing in Hutcheson when it stated:
So far as the union might have achieved this result acting alone,
it would have been the natural consequence of labor union activities
exempted by the Clayton Act from the coverage of the Sherman
Act.... But when unions participated with a combination of busi-
ness men who had complete power to eliminate all competition
among themselves and to prevent all competition from others, a
situation was created not included within the exemptions of the
Clayton and Norris-LaGuardia Acts.29
Thus, the underlying rationale of Allen Bradley is that only when a
union combines or has agreed with a non-labor group to achieve
something proscribed by the Sherman Act will the labor exemption
from antitrust liability be lost.
The opinion of the Court in Pennington utilizes the same rationale
by stating: "One group of employers may not conspire to eliminate
competitors from the industry and the union is liable with the em-
ployers if it becomes a party to the conspiracy."30 The union con-
tended that the rationale of Allen Bradley was not applicable to
Pennington because Allen Bradley involved an illegal agreement
27 325 U.S. 797 (1945). For relevant discussions in this area see Bernhardt, The
Allen Bradley Doctrine: An Accommodation of Conflicting Policies, 110 U. PA. L. REv.
1094 (1962); Cox, Labor and the Antitrust Laws-A Preliminary Analysis, 104 U. PA.
L. REv. 252 (1955); Frank, supra note 19; Sovern, Some Ruminations on Labor, the
Antitrust Laws and Allen Bradley, 13 LAB. L.J. 957 (1962); Winter, Collective Bar-
gaining and Competition: The Application of Antitrust Standards to Union Activities,
73 YALu L.. 14 (1963); Comment, 19 RUTGEas L. REv. 373 (1965).
28 Allen Bradley Co. v. Local 3 IBEW, supra note 27, at 810.
29 Id. at 809.
80 381 U.S. at 665-66.
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relating to price and market control while Pennington involved a
wage agreement which is a mandatory subject of collective bargain-
ing. In refuting this argument, the Pennington Court stated that
"there are limits to what a union or an employer may offer in the
name of wages, and because they must bargain does not mean that
the agreement reached may disregard other laws."31
The Court in reversing Pennington did not intimate whether the
evidence was sufficient to prove a conspiracy between UMW and the
large coal operators. 2 Therefore, the question remains open as to
the quantum of evidence necessary to establish a conspiracy. The
Court did indicate, however, that a conspiracy could be established
by "direct or indirect"38 evidence.
Mr. Justice Goldberg dissented from the opinion in Pennington
but concurred in reversal. The premise for the dissent by Mr. Justice
Goldberg lies in his belief that the majority has refused to recognize
the congressional intent of non-judicial intervention in collective
bargaining which he derives from a synthesis of all pertinent legis-
lation." Mr. Justice Goldberg stated:
To hold that mandatory collective bargaining is completely pro-
tected would effectuate the congressional policies of encouraging
free collective bargaining, subject only to specific restrictions con-
tained in the labor laws, and of limiting judicial intervention in
labor matters via the antitrust route. .... 5
The dissent was further concerned with the quantum of evidence
necessary to prove a conspiracy from a collective bargaining situa-
tion. Since the opinion of the Court did not require direct evidence
of an express agreement, Mr. Justice Goldberg feared that the exist-
ence of a conspiracy could be inferred from the normal legitimate
conduct of the parties. Such a course, Mr. Justice Goldberg postu-
lated, would inevitably cause the judge or jury to try to determine
the purpose and motive of the union and employer collective bar-
gaining activities, an approach which was condemned in prior cases
and legislative enactments.3 6 By permitting a jury to infer an agree-
31 Id. at 665.
32 Ibid. "There must be additional direct or indirect evidence of the conspiracy.
There was, of course, other evidence in this case, but we indicate no opinion as to its
sufficiency."
33 Ibid.
34 381 U.S. at 709.
35 Id. at 710.
36 Id. at 718-19. Mr. Justice Goldberg stated that: "Congress in the Norris.La.
Guardia Act and other labor statutes, as this Court recognized in Apex and Hutcheson,
determined that judicial notions of the social and economic desirability of union action
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ment or conspiracy based on the conduct of the parties, the judiciary
would be vesting twelve men with the awesome power of determin-
ing whether or not the union's expressed endeavors to achieve high
wages exceeded the limits of fairness by calling on their personal
opinion as to what the national labor-wage policy should entail.3
In jewel Tea, the opinion of the Court was limited to the "narrow
factual question: are night operations without butchers, and with-
out infringement of butchers' interests, feasible?" 8 The union evi-
dence offered in the district court and left undisturbed by the court
of appeals 9 bore out the union's contention that night operations in
self-service markets such as those owned by Jewel Tea were not
possible without some detrimental effect on union interests.40 The
Supreme Court held that the findings were not erroneous.4
Although Mr. Justice Goldberg concurred in reversing jewel Tea,
he nevertheless declared that the case also represented a "reluctance
of judges to give full effect to congressional purpose in this area
and the substitution by judges of their views for those of Congress
as to how free collective bargaining should operate." 42 According
to Mr. Justice Goldberg, if the self-service operations were allowed
to make night sales, the smaller service stores would likewise need
to compete at night, necessarily entailing night work for the union
butchers. The opinion further reflects the feeling that the direct
interest of the union in enabling its members not to have to work
undesirable hours in jewel Tea was a far cry from the indirect in-
terests of the union in Allen Bradley.
4
In Pennington and jewel Tea, the Supreme Court was faced with
the conflict which the Allen Bradley Court explicitly recognized two
decades ago:
should not govern antitrust liability in the area of collective bargaining. The fact that
a purpose-motive approach necessarily opens the door to basing criminal or civil penalties
under the Sherman Act on just such a determination and to making courts the arbiters
of our national labor policy is borne out not only by the history of the cases like
Alco-Zander but also by the cases decided today."
37 Id. at 720.
38 Id. at 694.
89 Ibid.
40 Id. at 694-95.
41 Id. at 737. Mr. Justice Douglas, joined by Mr. Justice Black and Mr. Justice
Clark, dissented in jewel Tea. The dissent believed that marketing hours were a
proprietary interest rather than a legitimate union interest and were of the opinion that
the agreement itself should have been considered as prima fade evidence of the alleged
conspiracy.
42 Id. at 726.
43 Id. at 727-28.
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[W]e have two declared congressional policies which it is our
responsibility to try to reconcile. The one seeks to preserve a com-
petitive business economy; the other to preserve the rights of labor
to organize to better its conditions through the agency of collective
bargaining. We must determine here how far Congress intended
activities under one of these policies to neutralize the results en-
visioned by the other.44
These two decisions offer no new, definitive solution to this conflict
and due to the steadily increasing demands of labor unions for free-
dom of action in their pursuit of improved conditions, it is reason-
able to assume that future collective bargaining agreements will give
rise to increased litigation between labor and business. If Pennington
and Jewel Tea are to be the precedent for future decisions in anti-
trust actions, at least two decisive principles may be noted at this
juncture. First, the law will remain firm that labor agreements which
involve terms and conditions of employment will be lawful when
there is no showing that the union has ceased to act unilaterally or
that it has further agreed with employers to impose terms of the
agreement on others outside the bargaining unit. Second, there will
be a continued reliance on the provisions of the Norris-LaGuardia
Act to prevent the issuance of injunctions against union activity
when it is seeking a legitimate union goal.45
The areas of uncertainty that Pennington and jewel Tea leave in
their wake are the boundaries of labor's exemption and the question
of how much evidence will be required to find a conspiracy in re-
straint of trade from a union-employer collective bargaining agree-
ment.
The Court stated that although the union may be seeking a par-
ticular goal involving a mandatory subject of collective bargaining,
it will not be "automatically exempt."46 The allowable inference
from this declaration is that the Court will continue to utilize the
Ipurpose-motive" 47 approach to determine the legality of an agree-
ment. In Mr. Justice White's words, the exemption can only be
ascertained through a "weighing [of] the respective interests in-
44 325 U.S. at 806.
45 Address by Robert J. Hoerner, "The Supreme Court and the Labor Exemption,"
Antitrust Section A.B.A. Convention, Aug. 10, 1965.
46 381 U.S. at 664.
47 Id. at 718. Mr. Justice Goldberg contended in his dissent to Penington that it
has been the policy of the Court to eschew from such a course in antitrust litigation. It
is questionable whether the "purpose-motive" test has been the consistent test applied
by the Court. Compare United States v. Hutcheson, 312 U.S. 219 (1941) with Coro-
nado Coal Co. v. UMW, 268 U.S. 295 (1925).
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volved .... -"48 The Court, then, must necessarily balance two factors,
"the concern of union members" 49 and "the effect on competition."5
Mr. Justice Douglas, concurring with the majority opinion in
Pennington, stated that an "industry-wide agreement containing
[Pennington] features is prima-facie evidence of a violation."'' i It
is inescapable that union-employer negotiations entail a discussion
of respective demands and interests. Will the fact that a multi-
employer, industry-wide agreement is reached be cause for arousing
suspicion ?12 In view of the fact that areas of antitrust applicability
to union activity are still unsettled, it would be an obvious prediction
that the Court will be called on in the near future to refine its deci-
sions in Pennington and Jewel Tea.
JOHN J. McCABE, JR.
48 381 U.S. at 691.
49 Ibid.
5O Ibid.
61 Id. at 673.
52 It is a generally recognized rule that a conspiracy need not be proven by direct
evidence; circumstantial evidence will suffice. E.g., American Tobacco Co. v. United
States, 328 U.S. 781 (1946); Interstate Circuit, Inc. v. United States, 306 U.S. 208
(1939).
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